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Comments
PLEADING-ADVANTAGES OF GENERAL ALLEGATIONS OF NEGLIGENCE, WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE HIGHWAY CASES
The modern pleader faces a dilemma as he prepares his petition in a neg-
ligence case. At the pleading stage he may not know what evidence he will be
able to prove; hence if only one or two specifications of negligence are alleged,
he may find that on trial he is unable to prove the precise allegations of the
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alleged and an equally good cause of action proved., As a result of this danger
he usually alleges all conceivable acts of negligence that might have caused the
injury, trusting that one can be proved.2 On the other hand, defendant, by
his objections to plaintiff's pleadings, seeks to tie plaintiff down as much as
possible, and at the same time to discover the grounds upon which plaintiff seeks
to recover. If plaintiff alleges only a few specific acts of negligence, defendant
can prepare himself to meet the issues at the trial and at the same time plain-
tiff has tied himself down. But neither of these advantages accrues to defend-
ant when plaintiff alleges many acts of negligence, nor is there any way to
tie plaintiff down to only a few of them.3 It is true that plaintiff is in much
less danger of varying from such a petition in his proof, but that is the only
benefit derived from such allegations and indeed the practice serves to compli-
cate the pleadings.
It is submitted that both parties will profit from the use of the pleader's
other alternative, a general allegation of negligence. From the pleader's point
of view such allegation is eminently satisfactory, provided that it states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and particularly if he is able to go to
trial on the original petition. Such was the usual common law manner of plead-
ing and unquestionably it was good against demurrer.4 A typical declaration
for injury on the highway alleged that defendant so carelessly drove his horse
that through his carelessness the plaintiff was struck and injured. 5 The com-
mon law pleader simply stated the act of defendant and characterized it as
negligently or carelessly done. If defendant truly needed more details in order
to prepare his defense, the court would grant his motion for a bill of particulars.6
The bill, in absence of exceptional circumstances, had to be demanded before
the plea.7 The granting of the bill rested solely on the sound legal discretion
of the trial judge.s Indeed, if the information sought rested within the knowl-
edge of the moving party,9 or if he had not properly demonstrated his need for
the bill, the appellate courts have said that the bill was improperly granted.' 0
1. See Kramer v. K. C. Power and Light Co., 311 Mo. 369, 279 S. W. 43
(1925).
2. See Cervillo v. Manhattan Oil Co., 226 Mo. App. 1090, 49 S. W. (2d)
183 (1932).
3. Since Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 916 requires a plain and concise state-
ment of the facts constituting a cause of action, query as to whether it would
not be advisable to sustain a motion to make such petition more definite and
certain.
4. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 206.
5. Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Rep. 848 (1833); Croft v.
Allison, 4 B. & Ald. 590, 106 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1821) ; Moreton v. Hardern, 4 B.
& C. 223, 106 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1825); Cf. 2 CHrTY, PLEADING (13 Am. Ed.)§ 708.
6. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 236; Comments (1923) 32 YALE L. J.
483, (1925) 19 ILL. L. REv. 315.
7. 1 TIDD, PRACTICE (8th Ed., 1828) § 641; Comment (1925) 19 ILL. L.
REV. 315.
8. Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 321 (Mass. 1824); Comment(1925) 19 ILL. L. REV. 315, 316.
9. Gale v. Read, 8 East 80 (K. B. 1806); Comment (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV.
315, 317.
10. C. & N. W. Ry. v. C. & E. R. R., 112 fIl. 589 (1884) ; Comment (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 483.
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In Missouri and other code states this manner of pleading has been approved
as stating facts constituting a cause of action against demurrer," upon ob-
jection to introduction of evidence in support of the petition, 12 and on appeal. 13
Missouri opinions have held the petition sufficient after verdict 14 and on objection
to introduction of evidence1 5 if it ". . . describes the act complained of with
reasonable certainty, that is with sufficient clearness to advise the defendant of
the charge he is to meet, and then avers generally that such acts were negligently
done . . ." Such allegation does not plead conclusions of law, since the
charge that the act was "negligently" done is the ultimate fact in issue, 0 and
the code requirement of fact pleading is met.
However, in Missouri and in most code jurisdictions the general allegation
is insufficeint against a motion to make more definite and certain.' 7 There ap-
pears to be no definite philosophy in Missouri as to the purpose of the motion to
make more definite and certain. Where negligence is alleged generally, some
cases have held that defendant is entitled as a matter of course to the more
specific statement of the facts upon which plaintiff relies, for these reasons:
that by statute s plaintiff must prepare a "plain and concise statement of the
facts constituting a cause of action without unnecessary repetition";'0 that only
by plaintiff's stating his case more specifically can defendant know how to meet
the charges in his answer; 20 that it enables defendant to prepare his case for
trial; 2" and one opinion states that its purpose is to restrict the evidence sub-
mitted to the jury to that alleged and proved, 22 which is to say that it is to
11. Farrar v. Shuss, 221 Mo. App. 472, 282 S. W. 512 (1926). Since it is
generally presumed that the general allegation in the highway cases is sufficient
against demurrer, there are no cases in which defendant stood on his demurrer
to the petition. See the dicta and collection of cases in Rueter v. Terminal
R. R. Ass'n, 261 S. W. 713, 715 (Mo. App. 1924). Also see form 23 in Mo. REV.
STAT. (1889) § 2237. This has been omitted in later forms.
12. Sullivan v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 97 Mo. 113, 10 S. W. 852 (1888); Benham
v. Taylor, 66 Mo. App. 308 (1896).
13. Ilgenfritz v. Mo. Power and Light Co., 340 Mo. 648, 101 S. W. (2d) 723
(1937); Wyler v. Ratican, 150 Mo. App. 474, 131 S. W. 155 (1910).
14. Zichler v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 332 Mo. 902, 59 S. W. (2d) 654(1933).
15. Mack v. St. Louis K. C. & N. Ry., 77 Mo. 232 (1883); Dieter v. Zbaren,
81 Mo. App. 612 (1899).
16. Crane v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 87 Mo. 588 (1885); BLISS, CODE PLEADING (2d
ed., 1887) § 211a.
17. Van Bibber v. Willman Fruit Co., 234 S. W. 356 (Mo. App. 1921);
Couture v. Gauthier, 123 Me. 132, 122 Atl. 54 (1923); Rathburn v. Burlington
& M. River Ry., 16 Neb. 441, 20 N. W. 390 (1884); and cases collected in
note (II) 59 L. R. A. 209; Comments (1928) 16 CALIF. L. REv. 151; (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 483; CLARK CODE PLEADING (1928) 207.
18. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 916.
19. Van Bibber v. Willman Fruit Co., 234 S. W. 356 (Mo. App. 1921).
But does not the general allegation give precisely such a statement as the
statute demands?
20. Sommers v. St. Louis Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 319, 83 S. W. 268
(1904). See 6 HOUTS, MISSOURI PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1938) 90 for Missouri
forms, with particular reference to form 2396, for making a negligence petition
more definite and certain, which concludes ". . . and defendant is unable to
make satisfactory answer to said petitions".
21. Jordan v. St. Joseph Ry., L., H. & P. Co., 335 Mo. 319, 73 S. W. (2d)
205 (1934).
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help defendant tie plaintiff down in his petition. Other Missouri decisions have
refused to sustain the motion automatically in the following cases. In a master-
servant injury case where plaintiff alleged his injury was caused by the
master's negligent construction and maintenance of the machine plaintiff operated,
the court refused defendant's motion to make more definite and certain on the
ground that, since the machine was at all times before and after the accident
within defendant's control, the law should not make plaintiff's right to bring
an action depend on his ability to state in a petition details he could only obtain
from defendant.23 In a similar master-servant case the motion was likewise
refused since less particularity of pleading was required of plaintiff where the
facts were peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.2 - In O'Connor v.
Koch.25 plaintiff alleged that defendant drove his team in a furious and rapid
manner so that his buggy struck the wagon of plaintiff, upsetting it and injuring
plaintiff. The court held that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion
to make more definite and certain because defendant would have no difficulty
in ascertaining with what he was charged and could have no difficulty in answer-
ing same.
Clearly if the petition leaves defendant in doubt as to the actual charge of
negligence and plaintiff is able to furnish additional information the motion ought
to be granted. 26 On the other hand automobile accidents happen so suddenly that
it is harsh to tie plaintiff down to specific acts of negligence when he is uncer-
tain how each witness will testify, particularly since defendant in most of these
cases has more precise knowledge of how the accident occurred than does
plaintiff. Perhaps courts under the codes would do well to note the common
law restrictions on the motion for a bill of particulars: defendant should con-
vince the court that he needs a more detailed specification of negligence and
that plaintiff is able to furnish it.2 7 Hence the refusal of the O'Connor28 court
to grant the defendant's motion seems sound in fact and in theory.
In brief the general allegation of negligence is good in Missouri against
demurrer but not against a motion to make more definite and certain, though the
majority of cases on that point seem to be subject to question. Practically there
are many advantages of general pleading, so far as the pleader is concerned,
particularly if he is able to go to trial on his original petition. There is no
danger of plaintiff tying himself down in his petition so that he will be unable
to sustain the allegations of his petition. Where plaintiff generally alleges the
defendant's acts and complains that they were negligently done, there is no
23. Collinsworth v. United Zinc & Chemical Co., 260 Mo. 692, 169 S. W. 50
(1914).
24. Rickaly v. O'Brien Boilerworks Co., 108 Mo. App. 130, 82 S. W. 963
(1904).
25. 56 Mo. 253 (1874).
26. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 207; Comment (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 483.
27. See text supra at notes 6 to 10.
28. Supra, n. 25. But see Rosemann v. United Ry. Co. of St. Louis, 180 S.
W. 452 (Mo. App. 1915) ; and Comment (1928) 16 CALIF. L. REv. 151, 154. The
writer of the latter expresses his hope that California courts will not continue
their trend toward refusing to make the general allegation of negligence more
definite and certain.
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1941], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss4/2
MJISSOUBI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
possibility of variance nor of failure to prove the cause of action alleged, if a
cause in negligence is proved. 20 Indeed, in Missouri evidence tending to prove
practically any kind of negligence may be admitted under the general petition:
under such pleading our courts have allowed introduction of evidence proving
the humanitarian doctrine,30 res ipsa loquitur l and any specification of negli-
gence, fairly within the allegation, that may have caused the plaintiff's injury.3 2
When his petition is filed plaintiff can avail himself of the Missouri statute
for deposition and discovery. 33 The statute has been made broad in its terms:
both parties are equally protected by their right to obtain a deposition from
any witness either before the trial is begun, or after; the discovery examination
may be as broad or broader than the examination on trial would have been; 34
and it has been the experience of trial lawyers using this process that witnesses'
testimony on the stand is consistent with the testimony incorporated in the
depositions.35 The plaintiff's usual procedure is to file a petition containing a
general allegation of negligence and at once proceed to take depositions to
discover what the evidence will show. Plaintiff then files an amended petition
setting up details of negligence disclosed by the discovery. This is done in order
to have a petition which is good against motion to make more definite. Seldom
will this amended petition disclose anything defendant had not already learned
from the depositions. In fact, it serves to tie plaintiff down so that often he is
forced to amend his petition several times, right up to the eve of trial, as he
discovers what he will be able to prove on trial.
A possible haven to a pleader who has failed to prove the exact specification
of negligence pleaded is the statutory provision regarding variance. The wording
of the Missouri statutes indicates that plaintiff may vary from his pleadings and
still recover, provided the defendant is not misled by the petition or in doubt as
to its meaning,38 or may even obtain a motion for a new trial if he proves a
29. In Hughes v. Kiel, 100 S. W. (2d) 48 (Mo. App. 1937) the petition al-
leged that plaintiff, a passenger in defendant's street car, was injured in a
collision between defendant's street car and an automobile, and that the collision
was caused by the negligence of defendant's servant in operating the said
street car. The court held that proof that the plaintiff's injury was caused by
the sudden stopping of the street car was more than a variance from the cause
of action alleged, it was a complete failure of proof.
30. Dieter v. Zbaren, 81 Mo. App. 612 (1899); Kellny v. Mo. Pac. Ry.,
101 Mo. 67, 13 S. W. 806 (1890); Hanlon v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 381, 16 S.
W. 233 (1891); Frankel v. Hudson, 271 Mo. 495, 196 S. W. 1121 (1917).
31. Rinard v. Omaha, K. C. & E. Ry., 164 Mo. 270, 64 S. W. 124 (1901).
32. Dieter v. Zbaren, 81 Mo. App. 612 (1899), failure to watch; Thompson
v. Keyes-Marshall Bros. Livery, 214 Mo. 487, 113 S. W. 1128 (1908), excessive
speed.
33. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1917: "Any party to a suit pending in
any court in this state may obtain the deposition of any witness, to be used in
such suit, conditionally."
34. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1923ff. For a thorough discussion of the
matter see RAGLAND, DiscovERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932).
35. MO. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1944. The deposition is read at the trial
where witness resides, or is gone, out of the state, where witness is dead, where
old age or other infirmity prevents witness from coming into court, where witness
lives outside the city in which the suit is tried or is gone more than forty miles
from the place of trial without connivance of the party requiring his testimony
or if he be a professional man discharging his duties at the time of the trial.
36. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 969. See Comment (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rrv. 357.
5
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cause of action but fails completely to prove the cause of action as alleged.'7
But these statutes have not been broadly interpreted by the courts 38 so that it
is risky to depend on them, and if general allegations are permissible, they
afford a much greater haven of refuge than reliance on the variance statutes.
The form for a negligence complaint promulgated in connection with the
new Federal Rules is substantially the same as the common law allegation:
"1. defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff . . ." 9
This complaint has been held good against a motion to dismiss. 4o The drafts-
men of the new rules reacted against the code fact pleading to the more general
allegations of the common law in order to provide more flexibility to the
pleader.41 Federal Rule 12(e) allows defendant to move before answer for a
bill of particulars or a more definite statement. The purpose of the motion is
to make such matters sufficiently clear to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading "or to prepare for trial."42 Under the Federal Rules the
bill of particulars and the more specific statement have been interpreted, except
in a few cases, 43 as aids in preparation of defendant's answering pleading, while
the information to prepare for trial is obtained by pre-trial conferences and
the discovery methods. 44 The reasons given for this view are that the motion
for a bill of particulars or a more definite statement are dilatory, and these
remedies are less efficient than the exhaustive discovery mechanism of Rules 26
to 37 and the pre-trial conference guided and directed by the court. Therefore,
the general allegation is not subject to a motion for a bill of particulars or
more definite statement unless defendant persuades the court that he must have
the additional details in order to enable him to answer.45
37. M o. REV. STAT. (1939) § 1167.
38. See annotations to the sections, noted supra notes 36 and 37.
39. Official Form 9, 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3609. See also
Official Form 10. Cf. General Allegation of Negligence in Operation of Auto-
mobile, 11 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA o' AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE (1927) 36,§ 6826: "That at the time and place of said collision the defendant so negligently
managed and operated his said automobile that, by reason thereof, he negligently
drove into and against plaintiff's automobile, thereby injurying and damaging
same as follows:".
40. Kadylak v. O'Brien, 32 F. Supp. 281 (W. D. Pa. 1940). In Hardin
v. Interstate Motor Freight System, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 97 (S. D. Ohio 1939) the
court sustained a motion to strike allegations of the petition in nature of
specifications of negligence in addition to general allegation of negligence ac-
cording to Form 9.
41. 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 547. Federal Rule 8(a) (2)
illustrates the difference: "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief .
shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." It calls for a statement of the claim, showing
plaintiff is entitled to relief, not of the facts constituting a cause of action, as
under the Missouri code: see n. 3 supra.
42. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 654; 3 FEDERAL RULES SERVICE
(1940) § 682.
43. Murphy v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 26 F. Supp. 999 (W. D. Pa.
1939); Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 31 F.
Supp. 483 (E. D. Ark. 1940). 3 FEDERAL RULES SERVICE (1940) § 682, n. 7.
44. Adams v. Hendel, 28 F. Supp. 317 (E. D. Pa. 1939); American La-
France-Foamite Corp. v. American Oil Co., 25 F. Supp. 386 (D. Mass. 1938);
3 FEDERAL RuLEs SERVICE (1940) § 683, n. 8.
45. Supra, n. 44. See Comment (1940) 39 MICH. L. REV. 1032.
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Examples used herein have mainly referred to general allegation of negli-
gence in the highway accident in which case the duty is apparent. In pleading
a master-servant injury, negligent maintenance of premises, or other negligence
case in which the duty is not apparent, of necessity the allegations to show duty
must be made.46 Such pleadings will be less general than in the highway negli-
gence case, but in all these cases the philosophy of the Federal Rules is best for
both parties and for the court. The Missouri courts have long recognized that
the general type of allegation is good against demurrer. Recognition of the
Federal Rules doctrine that a more specific statement should be required only
when necessary to enable defendant to prepare his answer would involve neither
hardship nor revolutionary change in Missouri procedure.47 While the state law
does not include provisions for pre-trial conference, the statutes and decisions
allow exceptional deposition and discovery procedure so that defendant, when
in doubt, can obtain the information necessary to prepare for trial. Discovery
through pleadings has been a failure4s and it has only served to tie plaintiff down
to specific allegations, to mystify defendant with a myriad of such allegations,
or to cause plaintiff to go through the farce of amending his petition by adding
specifications of negligence in accordance with discovery obtained by depositions.
JERRED BLANCHARD
46. See Official Form 14, 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3613.
47. See text at n. 25.
48. RAGLAND, DIscOvERY BEFoRE TRIAL (1932) c. 1; Comment (1923) 32
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